FRiedrich Merz, the next German chancellor, has said bluntly the very evening of his electoral victory, Sunday, February 23: his “Absolute priority” will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible in order to build “A real independence from the United States”.
It is a Copernican revolution because the Germans, like many other Europeans, had so far designed their security as part of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO), largely under American supervision. Mr. Merz also added that he had never thought of being expressed as he did. The openly hostile attitude of the Trump administration has brutally accelerated discussions on strategic autonomy advocated since 2017 by Emmanuel Macron.
Four questions arise: that of the magnitude and rhythm of the defense effort; that of its effectiveness; that of the countries that will participate; and finally that of its funding.
End of fragmentations
For ten years, the defense expenses of European members of NATO, which had continued continuously since the end of the Cold War, have gone up to reach 2 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024. It is still too little in view of the magnitude of the Russian threat, and especially the risk of withdrawal from the United States.
Emmanuel Macron and Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the commission, recently spoke of 3 % to 3.5 % of GDP. The effort to be provided is therefore 200 billion to 300 billion euros per year. It is at this order of magnitude (250 billion euros) that also routes The Bruegel reflection circle in a recent evaluation short -term needs.
To be effective, however, this expenditure will have to end the fragmentation of the European defense industry, which prohibits it from taking advantage of the effects of scale and results in massive additional costs. Estimates, which vary according to sources, exceed 50 % according to certain experts (the Railport of Enrico LettaPresented in April 2024, cites the figure of 100 billion euros per year). Increasing the amount of investments in defense without dealing with this problem would only increase these additional costs. It is therefore necessary to set up an industrial policy for defense at the same time. Whatever its methods, it will imply consolidation on a European scale, which allows remaining producers to benefit full yields of scale.
You have 60.45% of this article to read. The rest is reserved for subscribers.
